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The Death of a King and Rise of a Chancellor  
 
 
For the first time in his adult life, Axel Oxenstierna, Chancellor of Sweden, suffered 
through a sleepless night. On November 6, 1632, Gustav II Adolf (also known as Gustavus 
Adolphus, the Latinized version of his name), the king of Sweden, fell during the Battle of 
Lutzen, part of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) being fought by Sweden, France, and their 
allies against the Catholic states of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Holy Roman Emperor’s 
allies. While Gustav had an heir in his daughter Christina, she was only 6 years old at the time of 
her father’s death, and until her eighteenth birthday could not hold the powers of the monarch, 
per Sweden’s laws of succession at the time. She was, however, officially crowned while yet a 
girl of 6, due to Sweden’s rule of law requiring a vote of the estates for any new king, as even 
Christina was called.  
A humorous episode occurred with this vote, as a representative of the Lower Estate (i.e., 
the lower classes of society, non-nobles), known as Lars Larsson, demanded to see the young 
princess before a vote could be taken, as he and others were anxious about the notion of voting 
for a female to be “king”. When Christina was found and brought before the Riksdag, the vote to 
crown her was unanimous, as all in attendance were awed at her unmistakable resemblance to 
her father Gustav.1 This serves to illustrate the precarious situation in which all parties of the 
Swedish government found themselves after Lutzen, as none had given much credence to the 
idea that their beloved king would die so suddenly. Nevertheless, Sweden’s generals swore their 
allegiance and willingness to continue the fight in letters to Oxenstierna and the Queen herself, 
                                                          
1 Buckley, Veronica, Christina: Queen of Sweden (Fourth Estate: London, 2004), 46-47. 
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as did the members of the Privy Council, giving the new status quo legitimacy, and ensuring that 
Gustav’s will would live on, at least for the short term. 
As a direct result of Gustav’s death and Christina’s minority, the onus of power (as well 
as responsibility for Christina’s schooling and training in statecraft) fell to Axel Oxenstierna, the 
Chancellor of the Swedish state (more formally known as the Lord High Chancellor). To this 
man, above all others, the king had entrusted the governance and administration of the state 
during his long absences due to wars with Denmark, Russia, Poland, and the Holy Roman 
Empire, and it was largely due to his expertise that Gustav had been able institute the majority of 
his reforms. Thus, it followed that the Chancellor was the man most capable of leading the 
Swedish state to greatness with the king’s passing. With the regency of the young queen under 
the control of the Privy Council from 1632 until she took the throne in 1644, Oxenstierna held 
sway over nearly all important functions of the state. During this twelve-year period, the Lord 
High Chancellor served as the de facto head of state, and was either directly or indirectly 
responsible for the vast majority of Sweden’s advancements, both at home and abroad. Though 
some have considered him a mere regent, Axel Oxenstierna’s “reign” can be considered 
significant due to several differences from previous regencies within Sweden, or Europe as a 
whole. For the first time in early modern European history, a noble with no connection to the 
royal family, and no influence from the church, took control of the state in the absence of a 
reigning monarch, held power for a significant period of time and gave over power peacefully 
when the heir was ready/able to take power. 
Throughout his tenure as Lord High Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna was responsible for, or 
played a vital role in, a number of peace treaties and truces which not only increased Sweden’s 
power and influence in the Baltic region, but also in the HRE (Holy Roman Empire) and France. 
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These ranged from the Treaty of Knared in 1613 which ended the Kalmar War (1611-1613) 
between Sweden and Denmark, to the incredibly important Truce of Altmark (1629) which not 
only ended the war between Sweden and Poland, but also cemented an alliance between France 
and Sweden, which would last (albeit in slightly altered forms, with new treaties marking each) 
until the end of the war in 1648.2 Oxenstierna was personally opposed to the alliance with 
France, believing (rightly, it must be said) that Cardinal Richelieu was simply using the then-
powerful Swedes to further his own goal of destroying Habsburg hegemony over much of 
Europe. 
The Thirty Years War, which lasted from 1618-1648, was largely fought on the 
battlefields of the Holy Roman Empire, at the time an incorporation of numerous Germanic 
states under individual rulers, themselves subject to the rule of the Holy Roman Emperor, which 
was largely Catholic by tradition as much as by belief. As the famous Frenchman Voltaire once 
stated, the title for these lands, the Holy Roman Empire, was a misnomer, as “this agglomeration 
which was called and which still calls itself the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor 
Roman, nor an empire.”3 The Thirty Years War and its aftermath were largely an offshoot of the 
ongoing religious struggles between European states with interests in and outside of the German 
states over the notion of religious tolerance in the Empire for Protestants (at that time, only 
Lutherans were recognized by the Emperor as such).  
In 1618, the heir to the Imperial throne, Ferdinand II (who became Emperor the next 
year), began to mistreat his Protestant citizens, removing rights and privileges, which had been 
enjoyed for decades, from Protestant nobles and the lower class alike, and overtly giving 
                                                          
2 Frost, Robert I., The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721, (Pearson 
Education Limited: Edinburgh Gate, Harlow, Essex, 2000) 114. 
3 Voltaire, Essai sur l'histoire générale et sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations, trans. by Johnson, Forest R, (1756). 
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financial benefits to Catholics and the Catholic church. A number of these citizens in Catholic 
lands appealed to the Protestant Germanic states of the Northeast, such as Brandenburg, Bremen, 
and Saxony, which quickly rallied troops to counter the Catholic forces of the Emperor. 
However, after twelve years of brutal fighting and numerous defeats left these states on the verge 
of complete failure, the great powers of Europe (France, Sweden, Spain, and Denmark) were 
finally motivated to intervene directly in the war, each for its own purposes.  
In 1630, the German Protestants finally received the outside support they had prayed for, 
as into the fray marched the “Lion of the North,” King Gustav II Adolf of the Swedes, 
determined to free the German princes from what he, and they, saw as the tyranny of the 
Catholic Emperor.4 This, as much as any factor, led directly to the prominence, indeed pre-
eminence, of the Swedish Chancellor in the war following the untimely death of Gustav a mere 
two years following his landing in the Empire. The war was able to continue without the king, as 
the Chancellor assumed supreme command of the Swedish armies, and the king’s generals 
pledged themselves to the continuation of Gustav’s aims in the Empire.  
While a great number of generals and statesmen played pivotal roles for their respective 
nations during the period of the Thirty Years War, perhaps none were quite as prominent as Axel 
Oxenstierna. He was in possession of a keen intellect, which at times led him to look down upon 
his contemporaries, particularly his allies Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin and many of the 
German princes. This trait was inadvertently passed to his children, as his son Johan displayed 
this very tendency at the peace conferences in Westphalia, despite not having achieved what his 
father had.  Nevertheless, the Chancellor’s skill at negotiation, at seeing all options before him 
and choosing one which would he believed would best benefit his nation was undeniable, and 
                                                          
4 Wilson, Peter H., The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook, (Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstroke, Hampshire, 
2010), 120-121. 
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lauded throughout Europe. In a manner generally foreign to the continually bickering states of 
which the Holy Roman Empire was comprised, as well as other monarchies within Europe, 
Oxenstierna led Sweden through the death of her beloved King, through disastrous military 
defeats, and a failed alliance.5 Through it all he reacted with a signature poise, and a manner 
which suggested strength even when he was unsure of himself or of the correctness of his 
actions. In a number of ways, his life is symbolic of Sweden’s success during this period, having 
both tragedy and heartbreak, balanced by good fortune and great power, enough to make 
Sweden’s Chancellor, for all practical purposes, its king without name or crown.  
 
Early Life and Career Under Gustav (1583-1632) 
 
Though he later achieved power and prestige on his own merits, Axel Oxenstierna was 
born into the historically influential Oxenstierna family. Indeed, one of his ancestors, Jöns 
Oxenstjerna Bengtsson, the Archbishop of Uppsala, who became regent, was the only other 
person in Swedish history to hold what in modern terminology would be called dictator-like 
powers over the state.6 However, unlike his famed ancestor, Axel had the full support of the 
nobility in so doing, and was fully independent of not only the royal line but the church, as well. 
Despite the greatness which his family name seemed to portend for the young man, he began his 
career in the court of King Charles IX as a mere valet, having studied alongside his brothers at 
several universities within the Holy Roman Empire. His family connections and education 
                                                          
5 Parker, Geoffrey, Europe in Crisis: 1598-1648 (Cornell University Press: Ithaca,1979), 94. 
6 Wang, Eric A., “Jöns Oxenstjerna Bengtsson”, Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, 1913, accessed Nov. 6, 2016, 
http://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=1731.  
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granted Axel the chance, at the age of 19, to serve in his first official position in the Swedish 
court, though he was initially a mere valet to the reigning monarch, King Charles IX of Sweden.7  
Yet, through this position, the talented Oxenstierna gained status, and was sent to gain his 
first taste of European diplomacy in missions to the Imperial courts, particularly the Duchy of 
Mecklenburg, during which he served as a Counselor. At around the same time, the young 
diplomat was granted a prestigious seat on the Privy Council, signifying his status as a trusted 
servant of the King. As a result, he was sent as a member of the delegation to Charles’ adversary 
Christian IV of Denmark in 1610, in an attempt to dissuade the latter from war with Sweden, an 
action which illustrates not only the king’s trust in the young man, but his rapid rise through the 
ranks of the court as well. Unfortunately for both the Swedish king and the young diplomat, 
however, the negotiations failed, and the Kalmar War swiftly broke out, with Danish forces 
crossing into Swedish territories. Charles died the next year, before a true defense could be 
roused. This inadvertently served as the beginning of what would become a meteoric rise in 
power and influence for Oxenstierna, as the issue of succession quickly arose, given that 
Charles’ eldest son Gustav Adolf was only 17, and thus was unfit to assume command and the 
throne.   
This succession was due almost entirely to the influence and political power of the Privy 
Council’s eldest members, guided by the hand of Oxenstierna. Together the two managed to 
effect the necessary change to the laws of succession, in order to ensure a smooth transition. The 
limited experience which the young Councilor had gained under Charles IX gave him a drive to 
succeed where others had failed. With the other Council members, Oxenstierna was able to 
practically force Gustav into accepting the Charter of 1612 which placed the prince on his 
                                                          
7 Hofburg, Herman, et al, “Oxenstierna, Axel Gustaffson,” In Svenskt biografiskt handlexikon, ed. by Hofburg, 
Herman et al, 2nd ed, 1906, accessed December 13, 2016. http://runeberg.org/sbh/b0252.html.  
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father’s throne in return for a grant of greater authority and autonomy to the nobility. The 
Charter effectively ensured that the Councilors’ offices were no longer mere puppets of the 
king’s will as they’d been under Charles, but were capable of making independent decisions if 
necessary, a significant factor in the Chancellor’s later “reign.”8  
In an effort to please/thank the Council and the nobility, the young king granted great 
prestige and financial gifts to the Council, as well as acquiesced to their demands to grant the 
nobility more authority within the government.9 In gratitude for his key role in these 
developments, the other prominent members of the Privy Council elected Oxenstierna to the 
vaunted position of Lord High Chancellor. Largely due to the prestige this position granted him, 
as well as his own recognized skills as a statesman, Oxenstierna was able to effect a number of 
changes to the Swedish government both under Gustav’s purview and alone, which drained 
power from the monarch to a nobility-controlled bureaucracy. These reforms, as well as his 
effective management of the Swedish state during the wars, enabled him to remain in this 
powerful position for the rest of his life.10  
Having been a key asset in his successful rise to the throne, Gustav Adolf quickly came 
to trust his Chancellor for guidance, the two becoming fast friends, though their relationship was 
initially rocky due to their differing outlooks on the world around them and manner of dealing 
with stress. As the historian Michael Roberts notes in one of his multiple studies of Gustav, “It 
was a partnership of equals . . . their temperaments were very different: Gustavus dynamic, 
impetuous . . . Oxenstierna imperturbable, tireless, unhurrying; the one supplying inspiration, the 
                                                          
8 Roberts, Michael, Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden 1611-1632, Vol. 1: 1611-1626 (Longmans: London, 
1953), 22. 
9 Parker, Europe, 103. 
10 Hofburg, Herman, et al, “Oxenstierna, Axel Gustaffson,” In Svenskt biografiskt handlexikon, ed. by Hofburg, 
Herman et al, 2nd ed, 1906, accessed December 13, 2016. http://runeberg.org/sbh/b0253.html. 
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other ripe wisdom and many-sided administrative ability.”11 Yet in 1612, the young king 
demonstrated his supreme trust and faith in his Chancellor, saying, “It is not more particularly 
specified what he shall do, or how he shall act, in virtue of his office, but it is left to his modesty 
and his understanding as he may think best, and as he may answer it to God, to Us, and to all our 
loyal subjects.”12 This statement proved prophetic, given both Oxenstierna’s numerous 
accomplishments, and influence, both at the king’s side and behest, and those which were the 
product of his own pseudo-reign over Sweden during Christina’s minority. Indeed, the 
Chancellor was trusted enough that he was specifically selected to attend the king during his 
journey into the Holy Roman Empire in search of a bride. After a long journey and several 
meetings with princesses across the German states, Gustav found an agreeable and attractive 
bride in Maria Eleonora of Brandenburg; Oxenstierna had the honor of escorting the young bride 
and Queen-to-be from her home to Sweden, where Gustav awaited.13  
A number of difficulties faced the young king, however, detracting from his marital bliss 
and the initially stormy relationship he had with the High Chancellor. A problem of succession, 
dating to the accession of Gustav’s father King Charles IX over Sigismund III, King of Poland 
and head of the Polish House of Vasa, would eventually lead to war, which would eventually go 
so far as to inform Gustav’s beliefs about intervening in the religious crises in the Empire.14 
Though the young king had little military experience, he insisted upon leading his armies from 
the front, and won multiple victories, though he was nearly killed during the final battle of the 
war, the Battle of Trzciana. In addition, a struggle for supremacy of the Baltic coast with the 
                                                          
11 Roberts, Michael. Gustavus Adolphus, (Longman: London, 1973), 36. 
12 Roberts, Michael, Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of Sweden, (The English Universities Press: London, 1973), 85. 
13 Roberts, Gustavus . . . Sweden, 52-53. 
14 Roberts, Gustavus . . . Sweden, 35   
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long-powerful Denmark and its king, Christian IV, led to another war away from Sweden’s 
shores, which was only settled by the eventual Treaty of Knared of 1613.  
This treaty, which the Chancellor assisted in negotiating, was considered a disgrace to the 
Swedes, as it forced Sweden to pay an indemnity to Denmark in return for both the end of the 
war which the Danes had initiated, and the return of the fortress at Alvsborg on the western 
coast.15 The indemnity would not be fully paid until 1619. The future chancellor gained from this 
experience, as from that point he refused to cease negotiations until he had reached compromise 
which would be favorable to Sweden, though it left him with a deeply held distrust of Denmark 
and King Christian IV. Indeed, it seems evident that the Chancellor took the loss at Knared 
personally, as the later “Torstenson War” from 1643-1645 came as much from Christian IV’s 
decision to support the Emperor in the late 1630’s as from his belief and assertion that Denmark 
had always been the primary enemy of Sweden. Whatever the specific reason, Oxenstierna came 
to believe that Christian IV should be defeated as swiftly as possible, if for no other purpose than 
putting down an enemy far closer to Sweden’s borders than the Emperor in far-off Vienna. 
In addition to the Swedish troubles with the Danes, the Ingrian War (officially begun in 
1610) carried on, a war against Russia for dominion over the Baltic, as well as (the same being 
true of the later war with Poland) over dynastic concerns from a generation prior. Whereas with 
Denmark the young king had been all too happy to accept an unflattering peace proposal, the 
concerns over succession, particularly due to Sigismund III of Poland’s continued interest in the 
Swedish crown, made Gustav particularly interested in ensuring a positive outcome of this war. 
Utilizing a series of quick strategic strikes against the Russians, already weakened by the forces 
of Sigismund by the time he entered the war personally, the young Swede was able to largely 
                                                          
15 Roberts, Gustavus . . . Sweden, 42. 
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dismantle his foes’ counteroffensives. With the assistance of his faithful Chancellor, Gustav 
pressured the Russians to agree to the Treaty of Stolbova in 1617, which stripped the Russians of 
their access to the Baltic Sea, thus of trade, which could henceforth only be facilitated by the 
Swedish fleet.16 This granted Sweden not only a base from which to launch further strikes 
against Russia if need be, but some degree of financial stability as well, at least for the time 
being. 
With Gustav firmly in control of the state, the Chancellor and his monarch set to work 
restructuring and seeing to a number of reforms which likely would not have been possible 
without the direct intervention of Oxenstierna, given the training and experience he had gained 
previously in statecraft, as evidenced by the Charter of 1612.17 While it is undeniable that Gustav 
was similarly trained, as befitting a monarch of early modern Europe, the style of government 
which he had agreed to as condition of his enthronement gave him significantly less absolute 
authority than had been available to his father and grandfather before him.18 More importantly, 
Gustav had appointed a chancellor with experience (albeit limited at that point in time) within 
the very system which both men wished to reform, as well as training at both the professional 
(i.e. university training) level and familial one, given his family’s ties to Sweden’s government 
in prior decades.19  
First, the two set about founding universities in Sweden to train diplomats and statesmen 
of the realm, as it came to light that many from the Lower Estates could not afford the fees 
necessary to send aspiring politicians to secular universities in The Empire, and the majority did 
not desire their sons to be taught in Catholic schools with a doctrine-heavy curriculum. To this 
                                                          
16 Roberts, Gustavus . . . A History, 53-55. 
17 Roberts, Gustavus . . . Sweden, 33. 
18 Parker, Europe, 103. 
19 Frost, Northern Wars, 116. 
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end, Oxenstierna personally wrote to many prominent lecturers on the continent and requested 
their services. In addition to educational reforms, the Chancellor wished to reform the justice 
system, which heretofore had been, in the view of much of the nobility, too heavily focused upon 
the king’s judgment, which left little to no room for smaller claims or the claims of the Lower 
Estates, if listened to at all. Thus, as a result of the two’s efforts, the first Swedish Supreme Court 
was founded in 1614. To remedy the judicial problems which had previously plagued Sweden’s 
monarchs, Gustav explicitly authorized the court to hand out judgments in his name. This was a 
significant innovation, as an appeals process was also instituted, which guaranteed that anyone 
unsatisfied with their judgment could yet appeal directly to the king for restitution. This 
department was run through the office of the Justice Department in the Privy Council which 
itself answered, albeit informally, to Oxenstierna. With regard to the Council, the Chancellor 
reorganized and reshaped its specific purposes, expanding its offices to five, with the Marshall, 
High Steward, Admiral, High Chancellor, and Treasurer. Just as importantly, a new stipulation 
(ratified by the later Instrument of Government of 1634) required that the king (or queen) have a 
council, but also gave the king the freedom to choose the members thereof.20  
Gustav chose a council comprised of his own brother (the illegitimate son of Charles IX), 
his Chancellor, and two of Oxenstierna’s close family members, his cousin Gabriel Bengtsson 
Oxenstierna and brother Gabriel Gustaffson Oxenstierna. This decision proved incredibly 
beneficial to the Chancellor’s twelve year “reign” over the country, primarily due to the ease 
with which his policies and advice were accepted without debate. Yet this also held true with 
regards to his more controversial decisions, such as his continuous delaying actions during the 
peace talks at Westphalia in the late 1640s, in hopes of receiving what he saw as the best 
                                                          
20 Roberts, Michael “Oxenstierna in Germany”, In From Oxenstierna to Charles XII: Four Studies, ed. Michael 
Roberts (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991) 11-12. 
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possible terms. It also serves to explain a curious phenomenon which took place during 
Oxenstierna’s time in the Empire after Gustav’s death, when, as Michael Roberts notes, even the 
most minor issues of the state such as acquisition of cloth for Gustav’s funeral were referred to 
him.21 While this speaks to the Chancellor’s savvy and dominance of the government, it also 
provides a picture of a government which seemingly would have not functioned anywhere near 
as well as history shows that it did without its careful and calculating architect overseeing it. 
 In 1626, Gustav declared war on Poland, influenced by a number of factors, nearly all of 
them personal. From Sigismund’s standpoint, Gustav stood as a usurper, as both were direct 
descendants of the first King of Sweden from the House of Vasa, Gustav I. In addition, both men 
were the son of a king of Sweden, King John III and his younger brother, King Charles IX. From 
the standpoint of the Polish king, Gustav II stood as a symbol of his father, the man responsible 
for deposing Sigismund and thus minimizing his claim to the Swedish throne.22 Beyond even the 
important goal of securing his hold on his throne, however, Gustav held what might be called 
imperialist dreams. He desired to gain territory around the Baltic Sea to better secure his nation’s 
borders, but also to gain economically by gaining control of the lucrative tolls imposed on sea 
and river trade in the region and pressure the Catholic Habsburgs by removing a potentially 
valuable ally.23  
With these ends in mind, the Swedish king invaded, and soon began to ravage the Polish 
garrisons, winning several major victories. Incidentally, this also gave Gustav motivation to 
                                                          
21 Ibid, 17-18. 
 
22 Roberts, Gustavus . . . A History, 14-49. 
 Please note: This section contains a bevy of information about the succession of both Sigismund and 
Charles, which has been deemed too lengthy and unnecessary to the narrative to have added. Suffice it to 
say that Gustav II inherited a succession crisis which threatened to destroy Sweden, as both men had 
legitimate claims to the throne, and armies to defend them, though Sweden had been weakened by wars. 
23 Roberts, Gustavus . . .  Sweden, 62-63. 
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implement military reforms and gave his soldiers the experience of bloody, prolonged battles 
which they would rely upon heavily due to similar terrain and weather conditions in the 
Empire.24 The war finally came to its end only with the intervention of the French, particularly 
Cardinal Richelieu, King Louis XIII’s chief minister, who brokered the Truce of Altmark of 
1629. By this time, Gustav was eager to assist in the Germans’ war and was more than willing to 
remove his troops from the beleaguered state. In return, Sweden gained control of Poland’s 
invaluable Baltic ports, which came to be an incredibly useful source of wealth for the Swedes, 
desperate to pay off mounting war costs from before Gustav landed in the Empire.  
 Having been freed of his worries along the Baltic Sea, Gustav set his sights upon 
invading the Holy Roman Empire to assist the German Protestants, though he was influenced in 
this regard by the French.25 Supporting him, as always, was Oxenstierna, to whom the 
administration of the state during the King’s numerous absences had been relegated. In addition, 
he had been granted a governor-generalship over Prussia in the 1620s and had thus learned how 
to manage supply lines, troop payments, and recruitment both from Sweden and from conquered 
territories, skills which would very soon make themselves necessary. In 1630, Gustav and his 
army landed in the duchy of Pomerania. Less than a year later, in 1631, the Protestants saw the 
effectiveness and benefits of the impetuous Swedish king’s military reforms. At the Battle of 
Breitenfeld, his lighter units and cannon were able to rain death upon the slower, more static, 
infantry squares of the Imperial general, Johann Tserclaes, the Count of Tilly. By the end of the 
year, Oxenstierna had been recalled to his king’s side, having had a noticeable effect on the 
                                                          
24 Frost, Northern Wars, 112. 
25 Pages, Georges, The Thirty Years War: 1618-1648, trans. David Maland and John Hooper, (Harper and Row: New 
York, 1939), 117. 
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ability of Gustav to resupply his armies with all of the base necessities, as well as much-needed 
reinforcements from abroad.26  
 In 1631, the Protestants received a welcome boon with the signing of the Treaty of 
Barwalde between France and Sweden. Much like the Treaty of Wismar, which succeeded it in 
1636 (around the same time as the turning point for the Swedes, with their victory over an 
Imperial army at the Battle of Wittstock), it fully cemented the alliance between France and 
Sweden, the basis of which was established with the signing of the Truce of Altmark in 1629.2728 
While it must be reiterated that Oxenstierna was incredibly distrustful of his French ally, he 
dared not turn against King Gustav, who desired Protestant hegemony equaling that enjoyed by 
the Catholic Habsburgs of Austria and Spain. Gustav envisioned himself as the leader of an 
Evangelical Protestant alliance akin to the Catholic League, which would stand firmly against the 
kind of oppression which had antagonized the German princes into beginning the war.29  The 
Chancellor later recorded that, “had his late Majesty not betaken himself to Germany with his 
army, the emperor would today have a fleet upon these seas . . . the whole coast would have 
fallen to him and here in Sweden we should never have enjoyed a minute’s security.”30 This 
statement is also illustrative of his own reasons for continuing the war following Gustav’s death.  
Early in his service to Gustav, Oxenstierna was placed in a position which prepared him 
well for his future role as the de facto ruler of Sweden. It swiftly became his responsibility to 
manage the government’s affairs during the king’s multiple long absences, effectively governing 
                                                          
26 Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling. Avd. 2. Bd 13, Brev från Jacob Spens och Jan Rutgers, 
trans. By Johnson, Forest R 
27 Maland, David, Europe in the Seventeenth Century, (Macmillian: London, 1966), 385. 
28 “The Treaty of Barwalde, 23 January 1631, and the Guarantee for Bavaria, 15 January 1631” In The Thirty Years 
War: A Sourcebook ed. by Peter H Wilson, (Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2010), 131-
140-142. 
29 Gustav II Adolf Vasa, “The ‘norms for future action’, 1631”, In The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook ed. By Peter H 
Wilson, (Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2010), 131-132.  
30 Pages, The Thirty Years War, 131. 
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the whole of the Swedish state during these periods. His responsibilities were quite similar to 
those he would face following the king’s death. These included notable influences in or outright 
control over the Swedish economy, diplomacy with both allies and enemies, the administration 
of taxation, and the hiring of troops for Sweden’s armies. In addition, the wars granted him a 
great amount of experience with military matters, particularly when he was granted a Governor-
Generalship over occupied Prussia during the latter war. He also gained experience in 
diplomacy, as the role of negotiator and chief diplomat in peace negotiations fell to his office, 
known as the Chancery. He excelled in both positions, most particularly the latter, ensuring 
settlements beneficial to Sweden in the Treaty of Stolbova (1617) and the later Truce of Altmark, 
and various treaties with France.  
 
The War and the Home Front Post-Gustav (1632-1644) 
 
 
In mid-July, 1634, the body of Gustav II Adolf arrived in Stockholm and was laid to rest 
(due to delays caused by the distraught and depressed queen), accompanied by his faithful 
Chancellor and the other members of his Privy Council, the young Queen Christina, the Queen 
Mother, Maria Eleonora, and the hide of his beloved warhorse Streiff (the horse had died en 
route to Sweden).31 After the king’s burial at Ridderholm church in Stockholm, the Chancellor 
set to the monumental task of assuming the mantles of Regent (due to Christina’s minority), 
Supreme Commander of the Protestant war effort, as well as the Chancellor and de facto ruler of 
Sweden through his domination of the Privy Council and Riksdag. Given his years of experience 
with reform and administration under Gustav, and the deep trust which the latter held in his 
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Chancellor, it is likely that no other man in the government at that time would have been able, 
much less willing, to assume such a role.  
Rather than back away, as some would have done, Oxenstierna comforted the Queen, 
visited his estates, and promptly returned to the Empire, coming to reside in the city of Mainz.32 
Mainz swiftly became the informal capital of the Swedish state and all of its holdings, which it 
remained until Oxenstierna’s return to Sweden in 1636, following the disaster at Nordlingen and 
collapse of the Heilbronn League. It must be stated, however, that the Chancellor maintained a 
healthy correspondence with his contemporaries in the Riksdag and Privy Council, advising and 
indirectly controlling the direction various government departments proceeded in despite his 
concerns with the ever-changing political and military environment of the German states.33    
Desiring to act in a manner which reflected Gustav’s will, yet cognizant of his own 
shortcomings, Oxenstierna swiftly adopted a laissez-faire military policy, leaving strategy and 
order of battle to his generals while he himself oversaw recruitment, supply trains, and 
diplomacy with Sweden’s allies.34 In addition, Oxenstierna almost immediately began seeing to 
the creation of a League of Protestant German states, as envisioned by Gustav, to defend against 
“Catholic tyranny”, with himself as director and France as guarantor, with the personal assurance 
of Cardinal Richelieu.35 The resulting Heilbronn League, founded in early 1633, served as a 
godsend to the Swedes, who being far from home, were heavily dependent on their continental 
allies for food supplies, safe passage, and the recruitment of mercenaries.36 This is not to mention 
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the troops that states such as Brandenburg supplied from their own independent forces to the 
command of the Swedes and their allies. Despite the great responsibilities which had been forced 
upon him by his king’s assassin, the Chancellor did not waver in his commitment to walk the 
path Gustav had and avenge the wrongs perpetrated against his Protestant allies. Indeed, he was 
seen as much by himself as by others as the new champion and leading face/force for Protestants 
throughout the Empire.   
In the creation of this alliance the Chancellor was particularly successful. Being a 
politician and statesman, the Chancellor had attempted to secure peace with the Empire and her 
allies, an action which would have rendered the League unnecessary. However, to Oxenstierna’s 
disappointment, the involved parties could not agree on a settlement which benefited them all, 
and he thus moved forward with the plans laid out by Gustav for a Protestant league to challenge 
the Catholics.37 As Gustav had wished, an evangelical alliance to combat the Catholic League 
was created in the form of the Heilbronn League in 1633, which consisted of a number of 
German Protestant states (albeit fewer than originally envisioned) and Sweden, with France as a 
guarantor,.38 Through the League, which included, through lengthy negotiation with 
Oxenstierna’s contemporary (and chief political rival in Europe, Cardinal Richelieu, the nation of 
France, Sweden was able to maintain her war gains to that point, as well as gain much-needed 
funding for her armies, which Sweden’s economy could not easily supply.39  
Realizing that Sweden would need a new source of funds with the loss of tolls from 
Polish lands due to the expiration of the Truce of Altmark (the Poles became more concerned 
with Russia and the Ottoman Empire than with the Swedes shortly after their losses) the 
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Chancellor instituted a quickly-infamous project known as “reduction”. By this, lands belonging 
to the crown could be “bought” by nobles in exchange for good service in the armies, to include 
service of sons or other relatives, or more literally for a payment to the state’s treasuries.40 
However, this also meant that said lands could only be taxed indirectly (i.e. by their production, 
though the nobles could not be taxed for them as a land tax) which, in the end, hurt the Swedish 
economy. Oxenstierna, without the backing of his fiery king to keep the nobility in line, was 
taken advantage of in this instance, as nobles sought to make themselves more powerful at the 
expense of the state and, indeed, the crown. Though he attempted to stem the flow of lands to his 
colleagues, in this he was unable to make headway.41 As Sven-Erik Astrom reports in his 
research, the Swedish economy still felt the effects of this program decades later.42 
Despite the crowning achievement which the founding of the League of Heilbronn can be 
said to have been for Oxenstierna, problems arose almost immediately. Though the death of the 
Swedish king at Lutzen was instrumental in uniting the Protestant German states in a manner 
close to that which the late king had envisioned, many of the signatory states desired peace due 
to their far lengthier commitment to the wars by that point. This swiftly reached the ears of the 
Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III, who offered (albeit begrudgingly) a solution to the battered 
German Protestant states. Though the League collapsed with the signing of the Peace of Prague 
in 1635, the result of a successful ploy by Emperor Ferdinand III to wrest the all-important 
support of the Germanic princes from his opponents, several of the signatories remained in 
allegiance to France and Sweden, even if they were no longer willing to offer troops and 
endanger themselves through direct intervention.  
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Due to the terms of the Peace, which granted to each state the right to choose its own 
religious affiliation, a prominent reason many had been willing to go to war against the Catholic 
sovereign to begin with was taken away. However, the creation of the League in itself must be 
considered a mark of the political skill and savvy which the Swedish Chancellor possessed. In 
the face of mounting Catholic opposition to the allies’ cause, the creation of the Heilbronn 
League stood as a political weapon, a symbol of the resistance of France and Sweden, and their 
respective allies, to the power and influence of the Holy Roman Emperor. In addition, it served 
as a powerful reminder to the Privy Council and Riksdag that the chancellor, for his faults, was 
adhering to the will of the fallen king and had achieved an important goal as the war was 
concerned. Through the League’s creation, Oxenstierna firmly established himself as champion 
of the Protestant cause in Gustav’s place, and given the German Protestants cause to assist their 
“savior.” Perhaps most importantly, the Chancellor had ensured that due to their assistance 
against the Habsburgs, the Swedes would be rewarded in any peace settlement and have security 
against outside threats.43 
 In 1634, Oxenstierna wrote the Instrument of Government of 1634, which, among other 
things formally ratified many of the reforms made under Gustav, to include the separation of the 
government into five colleges, the enhancement of the Chancery, official changes to the 
military’s supply, weapon, and formation standards, and the creation of the Supreme Court. Just 
as important, this document served as Sweden’s first true constitution (though it went unratified 
by any monarch until it fell out of use during the reign of Charles XI). This was incredibly 
significant, as the government had previously (i.e., pre-Gustav II) been centered almost directly 
upon the monarch himself, with government offices being little more than titles for the favored 
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members of the nobility. Yet perhaps most importantly to the legacy of Oxenstierna as the ruler 
of the state was his claim regarding the legitimacy of the document. Interestingly, while the 
loyalty of the Privy Council, as well as the Riksdag, to the Chancellor was rarely if ever truly 
questioned, he ensured that his would not be a worry, legitimizing his work by stating that it was 
written only by the will and consent of Gustav, with whom he had discussed such a document in 
the event of the king’s passing.   
 Even beyond the writing of necessary treatises on the Swedish government’s 
reorganization and reforms, the Chancellor had a direct effect on his colleagues and underlings in 
Sweden following Gustav’s untimely death. Though he often complained about the amount of 
work which seemed heaped upon him by others, it is imperative to note the sheer amount of 
detail with which he concerned himself. For example, it was to him that the other regents came 
for such things as “determination of wage-scales for civil servants . . . At the Regents’ request he 
drew up for them a schedule of rates for tolls and duties in Sweden and Finland”.44 Indeed, the 
sheer amount of correspondence between Mainz and Stockholm during this period is noted by 
Michael Roberts as having been primarily due to advice the Chancellor issued to various colleges 
and departments, in addition to that which he kept up with the Queen, Cardinal Richelieu, and 
his generals in the field.45 
 The Swedish generals Baner, Horn, and Torstenson were all assisted in their efforts to 
hold together the Swedish forces by the efforts of German allies such as Bernhard de Saxe-
Weimar. Saxe-Weimar, a staunch ally of Gustav and later France, turned what could easily have 
been an even larger disaster at Lutzen into a hard-fought victory by furiously counterattacking 
the Imperial center, seizing the high ground and the Imperial artillery batteries, snatching victory 
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just as Imperial reinforcements arrived to the battlefield. The generals as a body seemed only too 
happy to allow Chancellor Oxenstierna to remain the Supreme Commander of the allied forces.46  
Any political conflicts, indeed concerns, these men may have had were with one another, over 
the subjects of lands awarded to victors, and who among them ought to be given sole commands 
based upon his merits and experiences under Gustav. For his part, the Chancellor seemed to have 
little to no issue with allowing his generals a high degree of free will, so long as they followed 
his general directives of the war, such as withdrawal to the north per his strategy, or advancing 
south with French support forces following the signing of the Treaty of Hamburg in 1638.47 
 In 1634, a disaster struck for the then victorious Swedes and their allies. A Spanish army 
moving north from Italy to assist against the threatening French and Swedish forces combined 
with an Imperial army and, in the swiftly following Battle of Nordlingen, shattered the Swedish 
front. Most devastating to the Protestant cause was the loss of a great number of Swedish 
veterans with whom Gustav II had entered The Empire, whose numbers had already been 
drastically reduced by the victory at Lutzen and the numerous smaller battles fought against the 
Catholic League troops in the interim. Yet this battle was far more than a mere military defeat, as 
it signaled a near collapse for Oxenstierna as well. Things went decidedly downhill for the 
embattled Chancellor following the loss at Nordlingen, to the point that it led him to abandon his 
temporary base in The Empire and return to Stockholm. From there, he continued to direct the 
war effort as best he could, and took a more direct control over the government at home.  
Two years later, however, an undesired and unexpected godsend (not fully appreciated 
until the beginning of peace talks gave credence to it) came for the Chancellor at Hamburg in 
                                                          
46 “Från Axel Oxenstierna till Gustav Horn/Fältmarskalk”, trans by Johnson Forest R, In Rikskansleren Axel 
Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling. v.16 pt.1-2 Brev 1636-1654 (i urval) 
47 Ibid.  
Page 23 
 
1638, with the signing of an eponymous treaty with France. Its stipulations included a guarantee 
that in return for a yearly indemnity from the French of one million thalers, the Swedes would 
continue to lead the war effort in The Empire and supply their own soldiers for this effort. The 
Chancellor was incredibly unhappy with this arrangement, never truly trusting the motivations of 
the wily Richelieu, and believing that he had been shackled to the whims of the mercurial French 
monarchy. It is incredible, indeed, that such was his opinion, given his previous unyielding 
support for Gustav’s nigh-imperialist visions. Whatever his personal views, however, he was 
able to recognize the potential benefit for Sweden, as the nobility scrabbled for land and power 
and funds for the war became increasingly difficult to come by.  
By 1638, the Chancellor had come to see that he had two options available to him 
pertaining to the war in The Empire; he could continue to push back against the Imperials, which 
would have the positive effect of potentially winning peace terms which would directly favor 
him and thus further his ends of a more protected Swedish homeland. He could also order his 
generals to withdraw in order to defend the homeland and the territory which had been taken to 
that point.48 The second option would grant his enemies avenues through which Sweden could be 
easily attacked or made weaker from the continent, and would deprive Sweden of most of her 
allies, both real and potential. Though he did so only begrudgingly, he chose to unite with France 
as it, if nothing else, it guaranteed that Sweden would not fight alone even if the rest of the 
Germans should abandon them. Realizing the benefit, he chose the first option, which with 
French assistance allowed the war to continue, and for Sweden to eventually gain from the peace 
proceedings at Westphalia. 
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This policy was affirmed legally by the signing of yet another treaty between the Swedes 
and French, the Treaty of Hamburg of 1638, this time guaranteeing a payment of one million 
French livres to the Swedish war effort per year to pay the soldiery. It also served a second 
purpose, formally ratifying the terms of the earlier Treaty of Wismar of 1636. By the terms of 
this agreement, however unhappy with its potential implications he may have been, Oxenstierna 
threw in his lot, and that of the burgeoning Swedish empire, on the successes of his generals.49 
He was rewarded by a reversal of Swedish fortunes following the Battle of Wittstock in 1636 
which laid the groundwork for a combined assault on the Imperial holdings. A major victory 
over the Imperial forces at the Battle of Second Breitenfeld in the northern Empire in 1642 
helped to quell any fears the Chancellor may yet have had, while follow-up victories in the 
battles of Jankau (1645), Second Nordlingen (1645), Zusmarshausen and the capture of Prague 
in 1648 buttressed French victories against both the Spanish and Imperial troops. Had it not been 
for Oxenstierna’s decision to move forward with the French at Hamburg, however, the war may 
well have turned once more against the Protestants.   
As aforementioned, Oxenstierna had always seen the true threat to Swedish hegemony as 
coming not from the Catholic Habsburgs, but from Denmark, particularly as Christian IV came 
to support the Catholic cause in the mid-1630s. Realizing not only the danger to the Swedish 
homeland but to the war effort in the German states should Christian invade either, the 
Chancellor sent letters to his celebrated generals and field marshals, specifically Lennart 
Torstenson and Carl Wrangel, directing a multi-pronged attack. A massive tactical victory at the 
Battle of Fehmarn which destroyed most of the Danish fleet, the arrival of Dutch, German and 
                                                          
49 Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling. 11,1: förra afdelningen: Brev 1634, januari-mars, trans 
in part by Johnson, Forest R 
 
Page 25 
 
French reinforcements, and Swedish defense forces fending off a well-prepared strike against 
Sweden itself, forced Christian to the negotiating table in 1645. The Danes had been caught 
completely unawares, but credit is also due to Torstenson, for whom the short-lived war was 
named, acting swiftly to the Chancellor’s command, having brought his army across the German 
states from Moravia.50 His forces having been devastated, Christian was forced to accept 
unflattering terms, a final revenge for the insult of the Treaty of Knared just over thirty years 
prior. By the resulting Treaty of Bromsebro (1645), Sweden received freedom from the dues 
pushed on all Swedish shipping, as well as the territories of Jemtland and Herjedalen in Norway 
and the islands of Osel and Gotland.51   
 
The Reign of Christina, Oxenstierna’s Loss of Power, and the Peace of Westphalia 
(1644-1654) 
 
In September 1644, Christina of House Vasa finally turned eighteen, and formally 
assumed control of the Swedish government she had been “King” over for twelve years. With the 
conclusion of her minority, and assumption of her full powers for the first time, Christina almost 
immediately began to strike out against the policies which her Chancellor, and his associates on 
the Privy Council, had put into place during her minority.52 Most particularly, Christina resented 
what she saw as a power grab by Oxenstierna and the nobility, and pursued a policy with a far 
greater emphasis on royal power than had been in place even under her father’s control. For the 
rest of her 10-year reign, the young Queen continued this fight, while the financial issues that 
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faced her father and Oxenstierna (and his government) continued unabated, despite her attempts 
to assuage these issues by seizing previously royal lands which had been sold (making them 
taxable properties once more) and attempting to draw down her military forces. Even had she 
wished to do so, however, Christina could not easily remove Oxenstierna from office, as he 
remained the most prominent noble in government, and had personal or working relationships 
with many of Sweden’s allies, particularly the French, whose funds were necessary to continue 
the war. 
When formal peace negotiations began in the German towns of Munster and Osnabruck 
in 1642 (the former prepared for Catholic, the latter for Protestant, plenipotentiaries), Sweden 
sent two notable personages in the forms of Johan Adler Salvius and Johan Oxenstierna. The 
former was a favorite of the Queen, and a former secretary, a man in whose abilities the 
Chancellor trusted, though he disliked the man himself for ascending to power as a favorite.53 
The latter was the trusted eldest son of the Lord High Chancellor himself. Like his father, the 
younger Oxenstierna possessed a rough demeanor, a feature which reportedly made it difficult 
for other plenipotentiaries to speak with him on the same level. This was, to the disappointment 
of much of the rest of the delegation, made worse by his insistence on pomp and pageantry as 
befitting a noble and the position of his father. In spite of this, Oxenstierna trusted his son to 
achieve the ends which both men believed would lead to a greater outcome for the Swedish state 
at the close of the negotiations. These negotiations took place despite the continuation of the war, 
which officials and leaders from nearly all involved parties hoped would facilitate better terms 
for them in an eventual peace treaty should they gain victory.  
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Through the differing personages of Salvius and Johan Oxenstierna, the two leaders’ 
vastly different strategies for the negotiations swiftly became evident. The elder Oxenstierna, as 
most sides in the war had done to that point, desired to push the advantage which the military 
alliance with France, and recent military victories such as at the Battles of Second Breitenfeld 
(1642), Jankau (1645), Second Nordlingen (1645), and Zusmarshausen (1648) granted his 
nation, and to push for as many territorial and monetary gains as possible.54 While it is unknown 
if he was aware of it, this strategy seems to have been one which could potentially have yielded 
much higher gains than Sweden came to receive, as Ferdinand III, realizing he was at a 
disadvantage, gave permission to, as Helfferich states “his plenipotentiary and close advisor, 
Count Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff to concede almost anything to bring about peace.”55 It 
was no mere coincidence that this willingness to concede came even as Protestant forces 
smashed their way through the city of Prague in 1648, a mere three days journey from the 
Imperial capital at Vienna.  
The Queen, however, desired a swift peace, and was willing to accept nearly any 
concessions which would end the war more quickly, whereas the Chancellor was far more 
willing to delay proceedings until such time as the Swedish and French armies were able to 
deliver a decisive victory, and indeed directed to his son to do as much as he was able to achieve 
this end. Christina conveyed her sentiments to Salvius, and the younger Oxenstierna, in a letter 
dated 10 April 1647:  
“You will obtain the best terms that are to be had without risk of a rupture; and 
you will refrain from protracting the negotiations, as you have done in the past . . . 
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You will take care not to allow yourselves to be deflected from your object by the 
imaginings of ambitious men. For you may be perfectly assured that neither 
personal eminence, nor aristocratic backing, will deter me from manifesting to the 
whole world the displeasure with which I view unreasonable proceedings.”56  
Despite these sentiments, however, Christina conveyed her personal opinions of both the 
influence of her Chancellor on the proceedings in a separate letter written only for Salvius’ eyes 
on the same day: “I also deduce from all this that there are those who are doing their best to spin 
out the discussions, if not indeed to wreck the treaty altogether . . . I shall let them see that not 
even the R.C. [sic] can move the world with his little finger.”57 By such actions, Oxenstierna was 
consistently stymied in his attempts to ensure a maximum payout for Sweden, desired due to its 
massive financial losses and the fear potential (later real) loss of conquered German territories.  
As Christina well knew, the Chancellor attempted on a number of occasions to indirectly sway 
the negotiations through his son, who shared his father’s desire for a maximum payout. 
Unfortunately for both Oxenstiernas, however, the actions and suggestions of Salvius derailed 
these attempts. Despite serving both his Chancellor and his Queen, Salvius obeyed only the latter 
in this instance.  
 When the treaty of Osnabruck was signed on October 24, 1648, with the concurrent treaty 
of Munster, the Thirty Years War finally came to a halt, leaving many of the German states 
largely crippled and a new balance of power within Europe, as Habsburg power declined while 
Swedish and French power rose. Most importantly for the German Protestants (at least those who 
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remained staunchly opposed to the Emperor), and for Sweden, the concept of cuius regio, eius 
religio (whose realm, his religion) was reinstituted, which guaranteed religious freedom to 
Protestants and (for the first time ever) to Calvinists in the Empire. Sweden received only 1/4 of 
the 20 million thaler indemnity which the Chancellor had fought so strenuously for, nearly all of 
which was spent in paying off the Swedish soldiery, as well as the thousands of German and 
Scottish mercenaries populating the Swedish armies.58  
Sweden was additionally granted control of the territories of Western (henceforth 
Swedish) Pomerania and Wismar, as well as the Prince-Bishoprics of Bremen and Verdun, 
which gave Sweden a seat in the Imperial diet. In essence, this gave the northern country a say in 
the affairs of the Holy Roman Empire. Yet here, too, the Chancellor was ill-satisfied, as he had 
hoped to gain sole control of Pomerania, as well as the river tolls of Bremen. In later years, 
Oxenstierna blamed Sweden’s eventual gains (which he saw as inferior when compared with the 
sacrifices made by the Swedish state and its population) in the Peace of Westphalia on 
Christina’s influence, a factor made worse in his mind by the events which followed, a short six 
years later.59 
 In 1654, to the shock of the nation, Queen Christina chose, after much deliberation, to 
abdicate her throne in favor of her beloved cousin, Charles Gustav, who ascended the throne the 
very next day as Charles X Gustav. As she was the only legitimate heir to the Swedish House of 
Vasa (her older brother Gustav being illegitimate and Charles belonging to the house his father 
belonged to), this was seen by much of the nobility not only as treason against the state 
(particularly given the continuing issues with state finance) but against her family and her name. 
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This proved significant due to the great respect many important figures in Europe had had for her 
father, and his legacy, which she seemed to be disrespecting by her refusal to continue her role as 
ruler. In addition, financial troubles remained rampant in the new Swedish empire. The sale of 
royal lands to the nobility, as feared by Oxenstierna many years prior, had had incredibly 
negative effects. As Lockhart notes, by 1654, “the nobility was, by far the largest collective 
landowner in the kingdom, with nearly 63 percent of all cultivated land in Sweden and Finland in 
noble hands . . . nearly two-thirds of the tax-rights to the farms of skattebonder (literally tax 
farmers, those who paid a yearly fee to farm land owned by others) were nobly owned as well.”60  
Yet, as with most things in her life, Christina stood fast, despite the protestations of the 
Riksdag, the Privy Council, and the repeated arguments put forth by Oxenstierna himself. The 
Chancellor was brought to silence on the date of her abdication, refusing even to speak to the 
assembly of nobles and dignitaries to tell them the purpose for the meeting, “by reason of an oath 
I had taken to my king, to endeavor to keep the crown on his daughter’s head,” which is also 
indicative of his refusal to remove her from power in earlier years.61 Even more scandalously, 
the queen converted to Catholicism and moved to Rome shortly after her abdication, where she 
continued to live, aside from trips to France and the Holy Roman Empire, for the rest of her 
days, under the protection of several popes. For his part, Axel Oxenstierna did not live long 
enough to have a significant role to play in the administration of his new monarch, dying at his 
estate a mere two months after the crowning of King Charles X Gustav.  
 
Scholarship Regarding Oxenstierna 
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 Throughout the twentieth century, a great body of research was completed on the subject 
of the Thirty Years War and those who had great effects upon the events of that tumultuous era. 
Of major note to a number of these historians have been men and women who shaped the world 
around them by their actions, or were larger than life characters. Gustav II Adolf is certainly one 
such man, and has been studied extensively by Michael Roberts, a prominent historian of 
Swedish history during this period. Yet even with his extensive research, the Swedish chancellor 
in this period, on whom much of the government of Sweden relied, has been largely overlooked 
in favor of the monarchs he served. 
 It is not particularly difficult to come to an understanding of how such an influential man 
could have been overlooked. For a great period of his life, c. 1636-1644, as Michael Roberts 
himself notes, there is a great dearth of documentation relevant to him or which directly involves 
him.62 However, it must be stated outright that a number of letters of Oxenstierna have been 
preserved within Swedish archives, but have not been translated or transcribed as yet, which can 
further studies into this arguably important man’s life and work. These letters, some of which 
have been used here, have begun to illustrate how important he was to Sweden’s system of 
government following the death of one of the greatest kings in Swedish history. The 
Chancellor’s extensive correspondence with both Stockholm and other leaders throughout 
Europe is impressive, and shows the sheer enormity of the man’s responsibilities as well as how 
tenuous, at any given time, his own position truly was. More than once, in fact, the Chancellor 
deplored his position and thought of requesting replacement, only to realize none else could 
manage things as well as he himself.    
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 It is certainly undeniable that within Oxenstierna’s letters his accomplishments are 
showcased, but they also serve to reveal his flaws to us, and his failings. From his letters to his 
generals we see a man unsure of military strategy, and slightly uneven in his assertions about the 
war’s ultimate goal. In a letter Michael Roberts speaks of, he reported to his brother in 1632 that 
he felt incapable of taking up the mantle he would be required to.63 Yet, in letters to the Privy 
Council, he takes the role of mentor, and the voice of experience, despite his audience of well-
trained statesmen like himself. In short, his letters show us a multi-faceted man, one who used 
power as he believed it ought to be used, even if modern statesmen would critique him for his 
methods or his aims.  
 It is unfortunate that Michael Roberts’ observation about the lack of materials about 
Oxenstierna alone seems to hold true in some respects. Indeed, the letters which have been 
preserved, though there are a great number, have several important limitations. While researchers 
have the ability to come to know Oxenstierna as a man, it can be difficult to pinpoint how he 
reacted to difficult problems, particularly with regard to some of the more complicated issues he 
faced while in office. Furthermore, a number of reforms for which his experience was 
instrumental, e.g. those outlined in the Instrument of Government of 1634, have been attributed 
to Gustav due to him not mentioning them in extant letters, though his influence can be clearly 
seen. Lastly, and perhaps most important, the Swedish Chancellor is very rarely spoken of in 
documents referencing Sweden during the period in which he was active, save in relation to 
Gustav or Christina, if at all. This is likely due in large part to their larger-than-life personalities, 
in comparison with a shrewd politician: Gustav a fiery, boisterous, man and a natural leader who 
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led his armies from the front, and Christina a charming, witty, intelligent woman who 
scandalously abdicated and converted to Catholicism. 
While several researchers have conjectured about the life and works of Gustav II’s 
enigmatic Chancellor, the scarcity of remaining evidence of his work during the latter years of 
Christina’s regency, among other factors, has often led to misunderstandings and misattributions 
of his accomplishments. Some, e.g. Georges Pages, assert that his work was dictated by the 
plotting and intrigues of foreign powers, particularly the wily Cardinal Richelieu of France. 
Others, such as Michael Roberts, have focused their attention almost entirely upon the monarchs 
he served. By so doing, few have struck to the very heart of a man who seemed to live quite 
contentedly in the shadow of those born to be his superiors, and by whom he has been repeatedly 
eclipsed in history books.   
 
The Legacy of Axel Oxenstierna 
 
Throughout his long and illustrious career, Oxenstierna served four Swedish monarchs 
(Charles IX, Gustav II, Christina, and Charles X), three of them as Lord High Chancellor, and 
was instrumental in the rebuilding of Sweden’s administrative systems, in some cases from the 
ground up. He saw to the creation of the first Swedish Supreme Court, an institution never before 
seen in his country, and oversaw the often extensive reforms of the Privy Council and his own 
office, the Chancery, as well as educational reforms for budding diplomats and career politicians. 
In so doing, he built a system which was able to survive the death of its primary executive, and 
continue to thrive nevertheless. His Instrument of Government of 1634 had far-reaching effects 
on the Swedish government as a whole from that point forward, and it is likely that this 
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document helped to inspire the later Swedish “Age of Liberty” of the early 18th century. It is 
telling that for a man who had gained so much influence, he never expressed a notion or desire to 
seize control of his country, or to name himself king.  
As previously mentioned, Oxenstierna was well-known for being rather cold and 
calculating in both his personal and professional lives, traits which he passed on to his sons, 
themselves prominent statesmen of the era (His son, Erik, assumed the office of Lord High 
Chancellor following his death, and held the office until he died unexpectedly a short two years 
later). He reacted to unexpected events with a swiftness and a calm which few others in Europe 
at the time could comprehend. Even Gustav himself once remarked on this trait of his 
Chancellor, stating “If we were all as cold as you, we should freeze.” With characteristic poise, 
the then-young Oxenstierna retorted quickly of his king’s temper, “If we were all hot as Your 
Majesty, we should burn!”64  
His uncanny ability to react calmly to nearly any scenario which faced him served him 
well both during and following the reign of Gustav. While the king was alive, the two were well-
known to argue heatedly over matters of state and foreign diplomatic overtures, as well as 
general strategy, but the king never faulted his subordinate for this. Indeed, by the end of his life, 
most far-reaching decisions the king made were discussed first with Oxenstierna. After the death 
of his monarch, this ability served the Chancellor well, as it enabled him to continue to act in the 
best interest of the state even when it appeared all had gone against him, such as during the 
combined difficulties presented by the Battle of Nordlingen, the expiration of the Truce of 
Altmark, the decision whether to renew his alliance with France, and the posturing of Denmark.  
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While his power and influence over the Swedish state waned in the last years of his life, 
being pushed aside by Christina’s favorites, Axel Oxenstierna remained an irremovable, near-
legendary, fixture of the Swedish government until the end of his days. Neither Christina nor her 
successor seem to have seen any way, much less reason, to remove him from his position given 
his numerous successes and accomplishments in nearly all facets of his work, from diplomacy to 
the recruitment of soldiers. Indeed, the Swedish Chancellor was held in great esteem and often 
begrudging respect by many of his contemporaries throughout Europe, both ally and enemy, for 
his successes in negotiating treaties, his willingness to alter his own plans in order to suit the 
situations in which he found himself, and his impressive handle on the ever-changing political 
climate of Europe throughout the war.  
Though King Gustav II Adolf remains the only king in Swedish history to have received 
the cognomen ‘den Stor’, meaning ‘the Great’, his Chancellor and his accomplishments have 
been repeatedly glossed over by historians and chroniclers since his death. Yet, in the eyes of his 
contemporaries, even those whom he served, Axel Oxenstierna was anything but a mere off-hand 
accessory to a military-minded king. Despite the animosity between the two over the running of 
the state, Christina spoke highly of her former tutor and regent, saying that he was “of great 
capacity, who knew the strengths and weaknesses of every state in Europe, a wise and prudent 
man, immensely capable, and great-hearted.” Indeed, the queen was said to have loved her regent 
“like a second father”.65  
While there have been other men in Sweden’s long history to have achieved similar ends 
under great stresses, even within his own family (his ancestor Jons Bengtsson, in one notable 
example), none exercised the restraint that he did, nor ran the state as effectively in the absence 
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of a legally reigning monarch. Just as impressive an accomplishment, he was the first statesman 
with no connection to the church or to the royal house through direct relation to give up power 
when it was his appointed time to do so. It is certainly true that the Chancellor had his faults, to 
include a seeming belief in the natural authority of the nobility, centering power upon himself in 
government, and a refusal to give up his own lands in order to assist in paying the debts of the 
state. However, Oxenstierna was also a product of his time, and accomplished a great deal 
despite a number of difficulties throughout his life in power.  
Often consulted by the leading men of his day, the Chancellor of Sweden was almost 
universally liked, or at least respected (in the case of Sweden’s royal house, even loved) by all he 
had relations with. He kept a vast correspondence with leaders throughout Europe, from his allies 
in France, Scotland, England, the Spanish Netherlands, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, 
and Silesia, to his enemies in the court of the Holy Roman Emperor, in addition to the 
aforementioned correspondence with the other members of the Privy Council on a semi-regular 
basis. Here we find a particular peculiarity, as it has been previously mentioned that little 
information about him has survived. While a great number of the Chancellor’s letters and 
writings have indeed survived, comparatively little information exists which describes his actions 
or thoughts about the period in which he held power over his state.  
Despite his often callous, calculating nature, he seems he had a great capacity for 
kindness, as evidenced by his ward Christina’s great love for him, even if she did not agree with 
several of his policies.66 As a man who had accomplished more than most statesmen of his 
generation, he was well-recognized, at times revered, by a number of the greatest statesmen of 
his age, as well. The famed 17th century statesman Hugo Grotius once referred to Oxenstierna as 
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the “greatest man of the century”, while Cardinal Richelieu, his French foil and ally, described 
him as “an inexhaustible source of advice,” and Cardinal Mazzarin said of him, “If all statesmen 
of Europe were on a ship together, Oxenstierna would be at the helm.”67 Though each of these 
men had undeniable impacts on the state of affairs in Europe during their respective lifetimes, 
none were forced to take control of a state at the death of its monarch, giving Oxenstierna a 
unique legacy which is unmatched among his European contemporaries, and one which has been 
too often ignored or marginalized by those who have come since. It is past time for Sweden’s 
uncrowned king to receive the recognition he richly deserves for his numerous accomplishments 
during one of the most tumultuous and deadly wars in European history.  
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Appendix I – Family Trees68 
(Boldface indicates mention in text) 
 
 
HOUSE OF VASA Family Tree 
 
King Gustav I  
 King Eric XIV 
 King John III  
  King Sigismund III of Poland 
   King Wladslaw IV of Poland 
   King John II Casimir of Poland 
 King Charles IX 
  Princess Catherine with John Casimir (distinct from the King of Poland) 
   King Charles X Gustav  
  King Gustav II Adolf with Queen Maria Eleonora 
   Queen Christina 
       
 
 
Jons Bengtsson (Oxenstjerna) 
 Multiple Generations 
  Gustaf Gabrielsson Oxenstierna with Barbro Bielke 
   Axel Gustaffson Oxenstierna 
    Johan Oxenstierna 
    Erik Oxenstierna 
Gabriel Gustaffson Oxenstierna 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68 Note: Not all offspring of individuals are presented here, for the purposes of simplicity. Queen Christina, for 
example, happened to be the only surviving child of Gustav and Maria, while the king had an illegitimate son from 
his mistress. Axel Oxenstierna, on the other hand, had 5 surviving sons, and a number of others who did not. 
Lastly, Catherine and Gustav II were only two of Charles IX’s children.  
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